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T he recent litigation seeking to secure the constitutional rights of the
mentally retarded provides an opportunity to review the status of such
rights and to suggest future methods of securing these rights, too often
flouted in the past. The basic proposition of this analysis is that the mentally
retarded should be afforded the same constitutional rights and respon-
sibilities which others possess. Because mentally retarded individuals are
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faces a dilemma; shall it deny or circumscribe these rights because of this
inability, or shall society provide the supporting statutory and administrative
mechanisms to help disabled persons exercise their constitutional rights?
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This Article concludes that all levels of government have a constitutional
obligation to provide the statutory and administrative means necessary to
assist the retarded in exercising their constitutional rights at the same level
of effectiveness as other, nonimpaired citizens. All statutory and adminis-
trative obstacles which impede or deny the full exercise of these rights
should be removed. Additionally, self-help programs and financial support
should be provided to insure the attainment of constitutional equality for
this disadvantaged population.
While all citizens possess the same constitutional rights, some are
uniquely vital to the retarded person. The most basic issue is whether a fetus
suspected of being retarded has a right to life. Once conceived, the mentally
retarded require supporting health and developmental services which as-
sume greater significance than for the so-called normal population since the
absence of such services impedes the ability of the mentally retarded to
develop to their maximum potential. The right to a meaningful education is
indispensable in providing the necessary tools for socialization and voca-
tional skills which the retarded must possess if they are to exercise their
rights of citizenship effectively. Freedom of an individual encompasses the
right not to be stigmatized by derogatory labels and the right not to be
institutionalized simply because of embarrassment or inconvenience to
members of the family and the community. Like other citizens, the retarded
are entitled to rights of privacy and association in their personal lives,
including the right to be free from involuntary forms of discipline, such as
sterilization and experimentation.
I. THE RIGHT TO LIFE
The threshold constitutional issue involves the right of a fetus diagnosed
as impaired to be free from an abortion of its life. This presents a difficult
question involving an intersection of the rights of the mother to privacy and
control over her own body, the interests of society, and the right of a fetus
to life. In Roe v. Wade' a challenge to a Texas abortion statute raised the
issue of whether a fetus is afforded constitutional rights of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
expressly held that the concept of "person" and the right to life, liberty, and
property as used in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment do not include the
unborn.2 The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger 3 and Justice
Stewart4 fail to consider the constitutional rights of a fetus, while Justice
Douglas's articulate defense of the mother's right to abort does not evaluate
her rights in terms of the right of her fetus to life. 5 Dissenting Justice White
washed his hands of the entire issue, noting that sensitive areas such as
abortion are best left to the political processes designed to govern public
I. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Justice Blackmun stated that the Court "need not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins." Id. at 159.
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affairs.6 Justice Rehnquist's dissent ignored the issue entirely. 7 This decision
is an inadequate justification for the termination of life because it fails to
analyze comprehensively the constitutional right of a fetus to life, and fails
to consider adequately the right of the male parent to procreation.
If no well developed constitutional right to life exists for a fetus, would
denial of life sustaining surgical treatment and support systems after birth
for a vegetative individual constitute denial of due process or cruel and
barbarous treatment? The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan8
concluded that no compelling state interest justified keeping a twenty-two-
year-old vegetative female alive when no realistic basis existed for assuming
that she could return to a cognitive or sapient life. The recognition of the
right to privacy, 9 which precludes judicial intrusion into areas of life in
which a right of privacy exists, I° was the principal justification for refusing
to order the application of life sustaining supports. Recognizing that her
incompetence prevented the exercise of her right to privacy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the right of the parent-guardian to use his best
judgment in exercising the right on her behalf. The rationale of In re Quinlan
was extended in Jones & Rogers v. Saikewitz I in which the guardian ad litem
of a profoundly mentally retarded victim of acute leukemia opposed
chemotherapy, and state officials sought permission to treat the leukemia.
In refusing to order the treatment, the court apparently justified such action
as a reasonable exercise of judgment by the guardian, while ignoring the
retarded person's constitutional right to life. In re Quinlan and Saikewitz do
not offer comprehensive policy justifications for the exercise of such draco-
nian powers. A contrary approach was taken in Maine Medical Center v.
Houle2 where the court ordered surgical and medical treatment for a multi-
ply handicapped infant on the ground that a human being is entitled to the
fullest protection of the law, including the right to life. The court rejected
the doctor's professional judgment that the probable damage to the infant's
brain made his life not worth saving.
The federal courts have not adopted a constitutional policy of guaran-
teeing the right of life to an unborn fetus. Although restrictions on the right
to abort during late stages of pregnancy have been predicated upon various
personal and social interests, these have not been predicated upon the right
of the fetus itself.
II. INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
If Quinlan and Saikewitz provide the vehicle for the termination of human
life, the judicial stage play for sterilization of the mentally retarded had
6. Id.
7. Id. at 171.
8. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
9. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
10. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. No. SJC-711 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. July 9, 1976), noted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (O.H.D.) 77-21012, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW
(April 1977).
12. Civ. No. 74-145 (Super. Ct., Cumberland, Me., Feb. 14, 1974).
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
already begun to run its course. In Buck v. Bell13 the United States Supreme
Court sustained a statute which provided for sexual sterilization of persons
who possessed a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility and were confined
to publicly supported institutions. In rejecting the argument that such a
practice violated due process or equal protection of the law, Justice Holmes
announced his famous laconic justification:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles
are enough. 
4
Justice Holmes's analysis is typical of the eugenic social Darwinism era of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fifteen years later in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 5 however, the Supreme Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard of review to invalidate a state statute that authorized
sterilization of persons convicted of grand larceny three times, but exempt-
ed embezzlers. In concluding that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Douglas refused to defer to the
legislature's judgment:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race. . . . There is no redemption
for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the
State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a
basic liberty. 6
Involuntary sterilization of mentally retarded persons was recently con-
sidered in North Carolina Association for Retarded Children v. North
Carolina.17 At issue was the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute
which required that certain designated state officials institute sterilization
proceedings under the following circumstances: (1) when the state official
believes sterilization is in the best interests of the mental, moral, or physical
improvement of the retarded person; (2) when the state official believes that
sterilization is in the best interests of the public at large; (3) when, in the
state official's opinion, the retarded person, unless sterilized, would be
likely to procreate children who would have a tendency toward serious
physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency, or where such a retarded
person, because of the deficiency, would be unable to care for a child; and
(4) when the next of kin or legal guardian of the retarded person requests
that the state seek sterilization. 18
13. 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see In re Cox, No. H4721-75 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Apr. 8, 1976), noted in
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 77-21012, MENTAL RETARDATION
AND THE LAW (Jan. 1978).
14. Id. at 207.
15. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
16. Id. at 541.
17. 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1976). The statute additionally requires (1) that a
petition be filed with the court containing information to aid the court in making appropriate
findings of facts and conclusions at law regarding the propriety of the requested sterilization,
(2) that written consent or objection of the legal guardian or next of kin be obtained before
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The district court held that the provision permitting the next of kin or legal
guardian to request the filing of the petition was unconstitutional because
there were no standards or limitations defining the exercise of such power.
The court, however, upheld the validity of the other statutory provisions
because they possessed a well defined, complete, and sensible scheme. For
purposes of sterilization, the court interpreted the statute to apply only to
mentally retarded persons who had a genetic defect which would likely be
inherited by their offspring and the mentally retarded who would be incap-
able of caring for their children. Noting that for some purposes mentally
retarded persons do not constitute a suspect class requiring application of
the compelling interest test, 19 the court found that the statutory classifica-
tion was not arbitrary or capricious, but rested upon respected medical
knowledge and opinion. The court, however, noted that the right of procrea-
tion was a fundamental right, and determined that sterilization would consti-
tute a denial of equal protection absent a showing of compelling governmen-
tal interest.20 Nevertheless, the dual legislative purpose of preventing the
birth of defective children, and preventing the birth of nondefective children
who could not be adequately cared for by their retarded parent, was held to
constitute a compelling state interest, and the statute, therefore, was
constitutionally valid. 21 The court's laborious interpretation of the statute
ultimately construed the statute to require sterilization only for the mentally
retarded who were likely to engage in sexual activity without utilizing
contraceptive devices and the mentally retarded likely to become pregnant
or to impregnate. 2
The court in North Carolina Association for Retarded Children made no
reference to the "least drastic alternative" principle first enunciated in
Shelton v. Tucker:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.23
Applying this principle, the court in North Carolina Association for Retard-
ed Children could have concluded that the statute was void on its face, and
the court's tortuous interpretation of the statute would have been unneces-
sary. Nevertheless, the decision represents progress away from Holmes's
analysis, rejecting eugenic Darwinism and recognizing that the nature and
causes of retardation are not susceptible to facile generalization.2 4 The
decision also recognizes the need for stringent protection of the procedural
sterilization, and (3) that a hearing be provided with Miranda-type protection, including right to
counsel, subpoena, cross-examination, transcript of the proceeding, and appeal.
19. 420 F. Supp. at 458.
20. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
21. Id. at 457.
22. Id. at 456.
23. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).




rights of the person affected, and requires that the evidence supporting
sterilization be clear, strong, and convincing. 25
The statutory rationale of the North Carolina statute is illustrated in In re
Cavitt26 in which the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the sterilization of a
retarded female as a condition to her release from a state institution for the
mentally retarded. In addition to having a low IQ and being a behavioral
problem in the institution, the woman already had eight illegitimate children
and repeatedly indicated she wanted more children. The Nebraska court
pointed out that sterilization was not absolutely mandated; the plaintiff was
required to agree to the procedure only if she wanted to be released. No
policy justification was given by the court, and no consideration was given
to less restrictive alternatives, such as counselling or the use of contracep-
tives. The record does not indicate whether her children were retarded or
whether she was unable to care for them.
The most recent illustration of judicial abuse in this area is Stump v.
Sparkman27 in which a state judge granted an ex parte petition without the
protection of a guardian ad litem for a fifteen-year-old girl whose mother
requested the sterilization on the grounds the daughter was somewhat re-
tarded and had stayed out nights several times with young men. The opera-
tion was performed after the child was told she was having an appendec-
tomy. After her marriage the daughter learned she had been sterilized and
sued the mother, the lawyer, the hospital, the operating surgeon, and the
judge. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, affirmed the district
court opinion that no federal cause of action would lie on the grounds that
the judge was immune. Justice White's opinion for the Court stressed: "A
judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural
errors. "28
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Powell, took the
diametrically opposing point of view. They found the majority's reasoning
factually untrue because the judge's actions were not normally those of a
judge and legally unsound because they were not performed by the judge in
his judicial capacity. Moreover, they believed the failure to use the estab-
lished state administrative procedures for sterilization meant that the judge
had not acted as a court. Justice Stewart believed that a judge was not free,
like a loose cannon, to inflict damage indiscriminately simply because he
announced he was acting in his judicial capacity. For Justice Stewart, the
failure of the judge to treat this litigation as a case or controversy, with no
litigants and no opportunity for appeal from his decision, meant that the
attributes of a judicial hearing had been absent.
In his separate dissent, Justice Powell pointed out that the mother's
behavior had precluded the daughter from vindicating her rights elsewhere
in the judicial system. Justice Powell was of the opinion that the usual
25. 420 F. Supp. at 457 (quoting In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 225 S.E.2d 307
.(1976)).
26. 183 Neb. 243, 159 N.W.2d 566 (1976).
27. 46 U.S.L.W. 4253 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1978).
28. Id. at 4256.
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assumption of the absolute immunity doctrine would not be operative in
circumstances in which the judicial officer behaved in a manner which
precluded all resort to the appellate or other judicial remedies.
The consequences of a constitutional doctrine which permits liberal intru-
sion into the right to procreation have implications which go far beyond the
interests of the mentally retarded. Recognizing the dangers of administrative
abuse, racial minorities and juveniles have reason for deep-rooted fear
because their culturally disadvantageous roles in our society often cause
them to be mislabelled as mentally retarded or to be mistreated. Procedural
due process guarantees designed to insure against arbitrary practices which
restrict fundamental rights such as the right of procreation must be strictly
followed. The doctrines of compelling state interest and the least restrictive
alternative provide means of curbing unreasonable restrictions upon the
exercise of such rights, yet no explanation has been given for not applying
the strict scrutiny standard and least restrictive alternatives in judicial in-
terpretation of involuntary sterilization statutes.
III. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The importance of the right to education was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education29 long before the
recent "right to education" actions brought by the mentally retarded. The
Court in Brown stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.30
The holding in Brown, however, was based on the concept of equality, and
the Court did not explicitly consider whether education was a constitutional-
ly guaranteed right.
Although the Supreme Court stressed the importance of education in
Brown, the history of education for the mentally retarded in the United
States is a dismal recitation of avoidance, delay, and lack of capital and
human resources,3 all leading to the exclusion of the mentally retarded from
the mainstream of public education. The first major step toward obtaining
educational rights for the retarded was achieved in 1971 through a consent
agreement in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylva-
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Id. at 493.
31. For an excellent summary of the history of education for the mentally retarded, see
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped
Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855,
870-75 (1975).
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nia. 32 This agreement recognized that all mentally retarded persons were
capable of benefitting from educational programs and training. 33 Without
identifying education as a constitutional obligation, Pennsylvania agreed
that by providing a free public education for all children, the state "may not
deny any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of educa-
tion and training." 34 Earlier, in 1969, a Utah state district court in Wolf v.
State35 noted the importance of education for the mentally retarded, and
determined that the right to education is a fundamental and inalienable right
guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions. 36
A. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
Education is Not a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court's holding in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez37 severely limited the constitutional right to education, thus
hindering the educational rights of the mentally retarded. Speaking for a
bare majority, Justice Powell found that the right to education was neither
explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. In rejecting the
argument that education was fundamental in the exercise of first amendment
rights, Justice Powell noted that it was not within the province of the Court
to create substantive constitutional rights in order to guarantee equal protec-
tion of the law. 38 In upholding the Texas scheme for financing its educational
program, Justice Powell applied the traditional rationality standard: "A
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review,
which requires only that the state's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. 1 39 Justice Stewart's concurrence
concluded that the function of the equal protection clause was to determine
whether the classifications created by state law were invidiously dis-
criminatory, arbitrary, or capricious. 40
32. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); accord, Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La.
1973).
33. The agreement additionally noted that the bulk of the mentally retarded were capable of
achieving self-sufficiency, while the remainder were capable of achieving a lesser degree of self
care. 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
34. Id. Recognizing the principle of normalization, Pennsylvania agreed that placement of
mentally deficient children in a regular public school classroom was preferable to placement in
special classrooms. Id. at 1260.
35. Civ. No. 182646 (Utah 3d Jud. Dist. Jan. 8, 1969).
36. The court in Wolf relied heavily on Brown stating:
Education today is probably the most important function of state and local
government. It is a fundamental and inalienable right and must be so if the rights
guaranteed to an individual under Utah's Constitution and the U.S. Constitution
are to have any real meaning. Education enables the individual to exercise those
rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States of America.
Today it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the right and opportunity of an education.
Id.
37. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Id. at 33. Justice Powell added, however, that when a state deprives or interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or liberty, the Court will carefully scrutinize this state
action. More deferrence will be given to constitutional deprivations by a state when the state
action attempts to achieve equality, however imperfect the attempt. Id. at 37.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. at 59.
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Justice Marshall's dissent rejected the majority assertion that only rights
recognized in the text of the Constitution should be protected through strict
scrutiny by the Court.4 1 He pointed out that restrictions upon the right to
procreate, 42 the right to vote in state elections, 43 and the right to appeal a
criminal conviction' were subject to searching analysis by the Court, al-
though no such guarantees appeared in the body of the Constitution. Apply-
ing the "sliding scale" analysis, Justice Marshall stated:
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not men-
tioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitu-
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of
judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminat-
ory basis must be adjusted accordingly.4 5
Recalling the Court's characterization of education in Brown, Justice Mar-
shall linked the right to education with the first amendment, stating that
"education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amend-
ment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of information and ideas,
whatever interests he may pursue in life." '46
Justice Marshall's searching analysis of the state justification for a par-
ticular policy and the means utilized led him to conclude that the Texas
scheme violated the equal protection rights of students in economically
deprived school districts. Dissenting separately against the majority's asser-
tion that a right was fundamental only if it was explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, Justice Brennan endorsed Justice Mar-
shall's "sliding scale" analysis. 47
B. The Erosion of Rodriguez
Despite the majority's refusal to recognize education as a fundamental
right in Rodriguez, progress has been made toward protecting the education-
al rights of the mentally retarded. The courts have invalidated educational
programs where education was provided to a portion of the class of mentally
retarded or handicapped, but not to all members of the class. In Nickerson v.
Thomson48 the Seventh Circuit denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint after the plaintiff had alleged that the school board had failed to
provide an adequate special education program to meet the needs of some of
the various physically and mentally handicapped, while other members of
the class were receiving an adequate education. The plaintiff contended that
there was no rational basis for the classification scheme which thus violated
the equal protection of the law concept. The court held that the statutory
duty imposed upon the defendants to maintain special education facilities
required equality of state action under the fourteenth amendment.
41. Id. at 70.
42. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. 411 U.S. at 102-03.
46. Id. at 112.
47. !d. at 62-63.
48. 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
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In Mills v. Board of Education49 the court found not only that the school
board had failed to provide the specialized education to which the plaintiffs
were statutorily entitled, but that the board had also denied the plaintiffs
their constitutional rights. Relying on the reasoning of Brown,50 District
Judge Waddy stated: "A fortiori, the defendants' conduct here, denying
plaintiffs and their class not just an equal publicly supported education but
all publicly supported education while providing such education to other
children, is violative of the Due Process Clause."51 The court rejected the
argument that insufficient funding precluded the education of these chil-
dren, observing that if such a condition existed, the available funds should
be expended equitably so that no child would be entirely excluded from a
publicly supported education. Thus, the lack of funds would not bear more
heavily on the "exceptional" 52 or handicapped child than upon the normal
child.
In Fialkowski v. Shapp53 multiply handicapped students sued various state
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 54 contending that the state programs gave
them no opportunity to benefit from appropriate education and training,
unlike the less severely handicapped. Denying defendants' motion to dis-
miss, the court distinguished Rodriguez on factual grounds, noting that
Rodriguez dealt with inferior education, while the present case alleged a
complete denial of education. The court stated that "[i]t would thus appear
not inconsistent with Rodriguez to hold that there exists a constitutional
right to a certain minimum level of education as opposed to a constitutional
right to a particular level of education. 55
Fialkowski thus stands for the proposition that equal educational opportu-
nity means equal access to minimal education services, while Rodriguez not
inconsistently holds that equal educational opportunity is not measured in
terms of equal financial expenditures. The court in Fialkowski accepted
plaintiffs' contention that the class of retarded children is a suspect class as
defined in Rodriguez: "A class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." 56 Accordingly, the court applied
the test of strict judicial scrutiny, and concluded that the plaintiffs had
stated a claim for relief.
A similar claim of discrimination and unequal treatment was raised in
Frederick L. v. Thomas 57 by several children with learning disabilities who
alleged they were being denied public education and training appropriate to
49. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
50. The holding in Brown was extended to the District of Columbia in Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
51. 348 F. Supp. at 875.
52. The court defined "exceptional" children as "mentally retarded, emotionally dis-
turbed, physically handicapped, hyperactive and other children with behavioral problems." Id.
at 868.
53. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
55. 405 F. Supp. at 958.
56. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
57. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
[Vol. 32
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED
their needs, while appropriate education was provided for "normal" and
"retarded" pupils. Plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to unlawful dis-
crimination since some students with learning disabilities were given special
instruction and they were not. In rejecting the defendant school district's
contention that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under section
1983, the district court characterized the right to education as a quasi-
fundamental interest.58 The court sought to find an intermediate standard of
review, stating: "We think that the Supreme Court, if presented with the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim, would apply the as yet hard to define
middle test of equal protection, sometimes referred to as 'strict rationali-
ty.' -59 Frederick L. is the first major judicial decision emphasizing the
tremendous professional problems in developing a program for this class of
handicapped persons whose learning disabilities are often difficult to ana-
lyze and for whom a suitable program of education and instruction may be
even more elusive to develop.
Emerging from the right to education cases is a realization that the
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez have been distin-
guished on the basis of law and fact. Although in In re Levy 6° the New York
Court of Appeals followed Rodriguez, the unique status of the blind and
deaf provided the rationale for upholding differentiated treatment for the
other classes of handicapped. The unwillingness of the United States Su-
preme Court to extend basic first amendment rights to education reflects a
judicial policy halting the activist role of the Court typical of the Warren era.
Beyond the chilling effect of Rodriguez upon the equalization of educational
programs for children in poorer school districts, and the resulting negative
impact upon racial minorities and poor whites residing in such school dis-
tricts, Rodriguez also adversely affects the rights of mentally retarded
children to obtain an education and training that will permit them to emerge
from the shadows of our society. Yet no judicial decision applying the
traditional rationality standard of review on the premise that education is not
a fundamental constitutional right has explained why race qualifies as a
suspect classification whereas other personal attributes such as poverty or
lack of intelligence do not.
C. Statutory Protection of the Right to Education
for the Mentally Retarded
Although the Supreme Court's posture on the right to education has
infringed upon the rights of the mentally retarded, recent statutory devel-
opments may provide an alternative means of securing the right to education
for this disadvantaged population. Federal law61 requires that a state adopt
and administer an educational policy which does not violate equal protection
and due process of the law. More importantly, the Education For All
58. Noting that the Supreme Court determined sex to be a quasi-suspect class in Weinber-
ger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 363 (1975), the district court in Frederick L., by analogy, charac-
terized education as a quasi-fundamental interest. 408 F. Supp. at 836.
59. 408 F. Supp. at 836.
60. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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Handicapped Children Act of 197562 requires that states receiving federal
funds for special education provide a program of education for handicapped
children between ages three and eighteen by fiscal year 1978, and provide a
free education for handicapped children between the ages of three and
twenty-one by September 1, 1980.63 The Act additionally requires a hearing
for identification, evaluation, and placement of the child, and requires that
the educational assignment of the child be determined by multiple criteria to
insure consideration of all attributes of the individual tested. 64 Consequent-
ly, recent judicial statutory construction and congressional enactments have
begun to erode the Rodriguez holding and the resulting limitations on the
access of the mentally retarded to education.
D. Tuition Cost Liability
The question of tuition cost liability has inspired various judicial interpre-
tations to sustain the principle that the public should bear the entire financial
responsibility of educating the mentally retarded. The petitioner in In re
Downey65 was certified as handicapped under a New York state law which
also imposed a duty upon the state to use all means necessary to meet the
physical and educational needs of handicapped children. The petitioner
sought to recover the difference between a state grant of two thousand
dollars and the actual tuition costs at a private school approved by the state
educational authorities, after the state certified that adequate instruction
could not be obtained at a public facility. The court determined that compel-
ling the parent to contribute to the education of his handicapped child when
free education was supplied to other children would deny the parent equal
protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment and the New York
Constitution. 66 The court noted that the child's right to an education should
not be abridged or limited by the unwillingness of the parents to become
financially liable for the child's education.
Tuition reimbursement for nontraditional forms of education and training
also have been upheld. In In re Richard G.67 a New York superior court of
appeals approved tuition reimbursement to the parent for a summer instruc-
tional program if the family court concluded that the child required the
additional instruction as part of his education, or if the child would regress
without the instruction. Maintenance reimbursement was ordered in In re
Cox6' where a handicapped child was placed in a private facility which was
not approved under state law. The court's holding was based on the fact that
the child had shown great improvement in her ability to function, thus
improving her living skills.
62. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(I)(B) (1976). The Act's definition of "handicapped" includes the
mentally retarded. Id. § 1424a(c).
64. Id. § 1413.
65. 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
66. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I requires the state of New York to provide a free public
education to all children.
67. 52 App. Div. 2d 924, 383 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1976).
68. No. H 4721-75 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. April 8, 1976).
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In Kruse v. Campbell69 the court considered a Virginia law entitling
handicapped children to partial tuition assistance if state officials deter-
mined that special schooling was required but unavailable in the public
schools and if the parents relinquished custody of the child. Plaintiffs argued
violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment and violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,70
which prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons receiving serv-
ice under federal assistance programs. The court agreed that the tuition law
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
the statute placed a heavier burden on poor parents caring for handicapped
children than on similarly situated wealthy parents. Furthermore, the court
found that forcing the parents to relinquish custody of their child to receive
assistance violated the plaintiffs' fundamental right to family integrity.
In In re Levy,71 however, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a
statutory requirement whereby parents of handicapped children other than
the blind or deaf were required to contribute toward their children's mainte-
nance in a subsidized educational program. The court rejected the argument
that handicapped children constituted a suspect classification and concluded
that the right to an education was not a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution. The court applied the traditional "rational basis" analy-
sis and concluded that the legislature could have reasoned that the blind and
deaf were more educable than other handicapped children, noting that the
blind and deaf traditionally have been recognized as a special class requiring
additional assistance.
State programs which reimburse the parents of "exceptional" children
attending private facilities, but place a ceiling upon such payments, also
have been attacked on constitutional grounds. Halderman v. Pittenger72
considered whether the due process and equal protection clauses were
violated if other children were provided a free public education, while the
parents of "exceptional" children were required to pay tuition costs in
excess of the allowable state maximum payments. Noting that Rodriguez
determined that education was not a fundamental right, the district court
nevertheless concluded that if a state undertook to provide educational
services, the funds must be spent equitably so that no child was entirely
excluded from the program. In Dandridge v. Williams," however, the Su-
preme Court concluded that a state did not deny equal protection merely
because limited educational funding by the state produced varying economic
hardship upon persons of differing economic need.
E. Judicial Enforcement of Education Orders
Three patterns of judicial behavior may be discerned from the right to
education decisions:
69. 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 38, 54 L. Ed. 2d 65
(1977).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
71. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976).
72. 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
73. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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(1) the judicial activist model whereby the judiciary sets substantive
and procedural standards, creates enforcement mechanisms, and
supervises their operation, retaining jurisdiction over litigation;
(2) the mediate judicial model in which substantive and procedural
principles are developed with the obligation for compliance placed
upon administrators, and jurisdiction is retained to insure
compliance; and
(3) the judicial restraint model in which principles, both substantively
and procedurally, are developed with the obligation for compliance
placed upon administrators, and the court does not retain juris-
diction.
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania7 4 and
Mills v. Board of Education75 the courts retained jurisdiction to insure
compliance with the order and decree. A different approach was taken by
the court in Harrison v. Michigan,76 a class action alleging that the denial of
access to the public schools because of mental, physical, behavioral, and
emotional handicaps violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution. The court determined that the issue was mooted by the
passage of new state legislation designed to meet the plaintiffs' objections.
If the adverse conditions were to continue, however, the judge stated that he
would rule in the plaintiffs' favor. This court believed the judiciary could
not design an effective, comprehensive educational program for the handi-
capped:
It [designing an educational program for the handicapped] simply is not
the sort of problem which can be resolved by the issuance, no matter
how well intended, of a judicial order. Any judicial order would neces-
sarily have to incorporate many of the implementation steps in Public
Act 198. The state is already taking these steps. This court could do no
more than act as a cheering section. This is not the function of the
judicial process. 77
This view is consistent with the court's refusal to retain jurisdiction to
determine the plaintiffs' eligibility for education and training on the grounds
that such action would single them out for individually favored treatment.
An intermediate judicial position was taken in Hoots v. Pennsylvania,78 in
which the court considered the plaintiffs' claim that forced attendance in a
racially segregated school by authorities who refused to consider the
foreseeable and avoidable adverse racial and educational effects constituted
a denial of constitutional rights. The court stated:
The remedial obligation rests with the school authorities; but where in
any way they fail, or are unable because of the circumstances of the
case, to fulfill any part of the obligation promptly and fully, this court
has broad equity power, and the duty to insure that demonstrable
progress be made now; that a schedule for planning be adopted forth-
with; and that necessary planning be specifically ordered and im-
mediately undertaken in order that a constitutionally adequate plan may
be fashioned, and implemented as soon as possible. 79
74. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
75. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); see notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
76. 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
77. Id. at 848.
78. 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
79. 359 F. Supp. at 824.
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The division of responsibility discussed in Hoots is illustrated in Panitch
v. Wisconsin,"° a class action suit in which the plaintiffs contended that
Wisconsin violated the constitutional rights of handicapped children by
denying them a public education. After the action was filed, a statute was
enacted which gave plaintiffs most of what they sought. Yet the court
retained jurisdiction in order to review the manner in which the new statute
would be enforced. When the plaintiffs questioned the school board's rejec-
tion of a recommendation by a multi-disciplinary team that the plaintiffs
continue the program, the court held that the school board was without
authority to alter the decision of the team.
IV. TREATMENT AND HABILITATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Involuntary commitment is based upon the principles that society has an
interest in the mental well-being of the retarded and that the retarded should
not make decisions regarding their treatment and care during a period in
which limited judgment prevents a rational decision. Yet institutionalization
without treatment, adequate care, or habilitation is an injustifiable denial of
freedom. Moreover, well-intentioned governmental intrusions upon indi-
viduals' rights may constitute cruel and barbarous treatment. Dr. Morton
Birnbaum notes that such reasoning has philosophical underpinnings of
seminal proportion:
It is proposed . . . that the courts under their traditional powers to
protect the constitutional rights of our citizens begin to consider the
problem of whether or not a person who has been institutionalized
solely because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institutionaliza-
tion for care and treatment actually does receive adequate medical
treatment so that he may regain his health, and therefore his liberty, as
soon as possible; that the courts do this by means of recognizing and
enforcing the right of treatment; and that the courts do this, indepen-
dent of any action by any legislature, as a necessary and overdue
development of our present concept of due process of law."1
Although the institutionalized individual may respond to treatment and
become functional through drug therapy, professional counselling, and com-
munity support, the individual will not, in all probability, become normal
and totally self-sufficient. Proper treatment and care at lower levels of
development, however, may result in greater happiness and fewer antisocial
acts of aggression against self and others. At the upper end of the develop-
mental scale, treatment may prepare disabled individuals for release from
the institutions to neighborhood halfway houses and group living arrange-
ments. For the mentally retarded, the right to treatment must be accom-
panied by a habilitation program to secure maximum individual
development.
A. The Right to Treatment and Habilitation as
a Substantive Constitutional Right
The question of treatment for the mentally retarded as a substantive
80. 371 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
81. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960).
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constitutional right was initially raised in Rouse v. Cameron82 where a
mental patient committed to an institution claimed deprivation of his statu-
tory right to treatment. 83 Judge Bazelon noted in dicta that confinement
without treatment raised three possible constitutional deprivations: (I) viola-
tion of due process of law in that commitment is justified only because of its
humane, therapeutic goals; (2) violation of equal protection of the law where
a mentally retarded person charged with a crime is committed indefinitely,
while others convicted of the same offense are sentenced to a fixed term;
and (3) indefinite commitment without treatment may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.8
The first legitimate recognition of the constitutional right to treatment for
the mentally retarded occurred in Wyatt v. Stickney. 85 The guardians of
involuntarily committed mental patients in various Alabama institutions
brought a class action against the Alabama Mental Health Board, contending
that the plaintiffs were not afforded adequate treatment. The court accepted
Judge Bazelon's theory in Rouse without elaborating on the constitutional
rationale, noting that involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional
right to receive "such individual treatment as will give them a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition." 6 The
court subsequently devised and ordered implementation of a thorough treat-
ment program for the institutionalized retarded, 87 and clearly established a
right to habilitation in addition to a right to treatment. The court noted that
treatment included the "prevention, amelioration and/or cure of a resident's
physical disabilities or illnesses," 8 8 while habilitation was a broader
concept, involving psychiatric and educational assistance and treatment,
which raised the level of physical, mental, and social efficiency of the
retarded.8 9
The Rouse-Wyatt constitutional rationale was limited one year later in
New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller.90
Although the court accepted the proposition that the quid pro quo for
82. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
83. D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1973). The statute provides that a "person hospitalized in a public
hospital for a mental illness shall . . . be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treat-
ment."
84. 373 F.2d at 453.
85. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.) (court reserved ruling on inadequacy of the treatment
center in order to give state officials six months to implement proper standards), modified, 334
F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (court reserved ruling in order for parties to present proposed
standards that met medical and constitutional requirements), modified, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (program devised to meet minimum treatment requirements), aff'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (court recognized a
constitutional right to adequate treatment but reversed and remanded for further consideration
of the proper means of implementing the proposed standards); accord, Nason v. Superintend-
ent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (right to treatment is a
substantive constitutional right under the Massachusetts Constitution).
86. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
87. See notes 121-23 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the court ordered
treatment and habilitation program in Wyatt.
88. 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 395-96.
90. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), consent judgment approved sub nom. New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). This
decision is often referred to as the Willowbrook case because it involved the residents of the
Willowbrook State Institution in New York.
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commitment in lieu of criminal imprisonment was the right to treatment, the
court refused to expand this right to impose a duty of habilitation upon the
state. The court in Rockefeller stressed that the equal protection, due proc-
ess, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses establish a right to protection
from harm, but they do not establish a right to habilitation.9 The right to
protection from harm includes privileges afforded prison inmates, such as
freedom from assault, medical care, an opportunity to exercise and have
outdoor recreation, basic hygienic conditions, and adequate physical living
conditions.92
The court's approval of a consent judgment in Rockefeller, however,
recognized that the so-called right to freedom from harm may be the func-
tional equivalent of the right to treatment and habilitation. The court noted,
"Somewhat different legal rubrics have been employed in these cases-
'protection from harm' in this case and 'right to treatment' and 'need for
care' in others. It appears that there is no bright line separating these
standards. -93
In Burnham v. Department of Public Health,94 however, the district court
recognized a clear delineation in the standards by which the rights of an
institutionalized retarded person should be evaluated. The court disagreed
with the holding in Wyatt, 95 stating that residents of a mental institution
might have a moral right to treatment, but there is no constitutional right to
treatment absent a federal or state statute. 96 The Fifth Circuit, however,
considered Wyatt and Burnham simultaneously on appeal' and adopted the
Wyatt rationale establishing a right to treatment and habilitation.9" The
court's analysis in Rockefeller and the district court's opinion in Burnham
are inadequate because they do not deal thoroughly with the due process
aspects of commitment, they fail to consider adequately comparable rights
possessed by prison inmates,99 and they generally indicate an insensitive
attitude toward the frustrations of institutional inmates who are unable to
obtain relief through legislative and executive channels.
Despite the inconsistent lower court holdings on the nature and extent of
91. The court additionally rejected any distinction between voluntary and involuntary
patients in terms of constitutional rights, noting that the residents are "for the most part
confined behind locked gates, and are held without the possibility of a meaningful waiver of
their right to freedom." 357 F. Supp. at 764.
92. Id. at 764-65.
93. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
95. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
96. The court in Burnham stressed that the judiciary was an inappropriate agency to deal
with treatment issues which were better left in the hands of trained professionals. 349 F. Supp.
at 1340, 1344.
97. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Burnham v. Department of Pub.
Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
98. In finding an institutional right to treatment and habilitation, the Fifth Circuit relied
upon its opinion in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). For a discussion of Donaldson and its ultimate impact on Wyatt
and Burnham, see notes 100-03 infra and accompanying text.
99. For a comprehensive analysis of the rights of prison inmates to treatment and habilita-
tion, see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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the right to treatment, the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldsonl
°°
failed to provide guidelines in this important area of constitutional rights. An
action was brought in Donaldson by a former involuntarily committed
patient of a state mental hospital who alleged deprivation of his constitution-
al right to receive treatment or be released. The plaintiff alleged violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that hospital officials, by depriving him of the
right to receive treatment, blocked his release, even though he was not
considered dangerous and trustworthy persons and agencies were willing to
assume responsibility for him after release. The Fifth Circuit found that the
plaintiff, a Christian Scientist who refused to take any medication or to
submit to electroshock therapy for religious reasons, was denied less ex-
treme forms of rehabilitative treatment, such as occupational therapy and
psychiatric treatment.' 0' Noting that due process requires minimum stan-
dards of treatment be established for nondangerous patients, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that there exists "a near unanimous recognition that
governments must afford a quid pro quo when they confine citizens in
circumstances where the conventional limitations of the criminal process are
inapplicable.' 02 The court additionally stated that when "a nondangerous
patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital, the only
constitutionally permissible purpose of confinement is to provide treatment,
and that such a patient has a constitutional right to such treatment as will
''103help him to be cured or to improve his mental condition ....
On review, the Supreme Court ignored the right to treatment issue and
recast the decision in terms of the fourteenth amendment right to liberty. °
The Court determined that a state could not constitutionally confine a
nondangerous individual capable of surviving safely on his own or with the
aid of willing family or friends. The Court ultimately concluded that Donald-
son's constitutional right to freedom was violated without due process of
law. Although Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court ignored the treatment
issue, Chief Justice Burger's concurrence 05 concluded that requiring treat-
ment for the mentally retarded was of such recent origin that no historical
basis existed for imposing such a limitation upon state power. The Chief
Justice's rejection of the quid pro quo theory was premised upon the
undesirability of fashioning a new substantive constitutional right and the
Court's refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the Florida political
branch. Chief Justice Burger noted that the Fifth Circuit unequivocally
approved the district court's determination that " 'a person who is involun-
tarily committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to
receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be
cured.' '"I Chief Justice Burger affirmatively asserted that "[t]he Court's
opinion plainly gives no approval to that holding and makes clear that it
binds neither the parties to this case nor the courts of the Fifth Circuit."' 07
100. 422 U.S. 587 (1975).
101. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
102. 493 F.2d at 524.
103. Id. at 527.
104. 422 U.S. at 573.
105. Id. at 578.
106. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED
The Court's due process analysis in Donaldson is, in essence, an abdica-
tion of the judiciary's responsibility to protect the rights of the mentally
retarded, and has created confusion among the federal and state courts
concerning the appropriate judicial policy in this area. By refusing to bind
the courts of the Fifth Circuit to the lower court holding in Donaldson, the
Chief Justice's concurrence appears to revitalize the district court's holding
in Burnham denying the right to treatment. In fact, a federal district court in
Bettencourt v. Rhodes'08 recently refused to recognize a constitutional right
to habilitation. The court stated that "[t]he Constitution imposes no duty
upon a state to provide social services to its citizens. . . .The Constitution
requires only that when a state voluntarily undertakes to confine mentally
retarded persons, it is obligated to provide them with reasonable medical
treatment."' 1° The Eighth Circuit in Welsh v. Likins,"10 however, held that
the mentally retarded are afforded constitutional rights of treatment and
habilitation, and noted that the right to treatment and habilitation is probably
clearer today than in 1974, irrespective of the Supreme Court's 1975 holding
in Donaldson."'
B. The Right to be Free from Mistreatment
Although the law is unsettled regarding the existence of constitutional
rights to treatment and habilitation, there is clearly a corresponding right to
be free from mistreatment while institutionalized. In Rhem v. Malcolm"
12
prisoners confined in a section of the Manhattan House of Detention for
Men, known as "The Tombs," alleged that noise, heat, inadequacy of
ventilation, excessive lock-ins, lack of exercise, and cruel visitation condi-
tions violated their constitutional rights. The court found that the plaintiffs'
claim fell within both the eighth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled to be free from mistreatment and
protected from harm."13
In Spence v. Staras'14 state hospital personnel knowingly permitted a
mute mental patient to be beaten by fellow patients. Reversing the district
court's dismissal of the complaint, the Seventh Circuit found that the plain-
tiff had stated a claim for relief under section 1983, and determined that the
defendants were acting under the color of state law." 5 The court stated that
108. No. C77-12 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 1977), noted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 78-21012, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW 27 (Jan. 1978).
109. Id. at 28-29.
110. 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
111. Id. at 1126 n.6.
112. 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
113. 371 F. Supp. at 627-28.
114. 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974).
115. Id. at 558. At least one federal court has construed the state action requirement of a §
1983 suit narrowly, reminiscent of post-Civil War judicial construction. In Doyle v. Unicare
Health Servs., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1975), the administrator of the estate of a
mentally retarded decedent sued a private institution on the grounds that her death had been
caused by the refusal to give treatment and by a wanton reckless disregard of the decedent's
condition, in violation of Illinois statutes and regulations. Rejecting the plaintiff's § 1983 claim
the court pointed to the "private for profit" status of the facility which did not bring the
institution's action within the "color of state law" requirements of the federal statute. Despite
the institution's receipt of more than half of its funds from the state and the necessity to comply
with state licensing and operating requirements, the court found insufficient "nexus" to be
classified as state action. In applying the nexus test of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
"[i]t is . . . clear that the deceased had a right, under the fourteenth
amendment, to be secure in his life and person while confined under state
authority. . . .The defendants, being responsible for the decedent's care
and safekeeping, had a duty to protect him from attacks by fellow in-
mates."
1 6
In Knecht v. Gillman"7 a court-committed mental patient violated the
institution's rules by lying, swearing, and disobeying orders, and apomor-
phine was administered as an aversion-type therapy. This therapy, which
induced vomiting and deleterious cardiovascular effects, was not treatment
and constituted cruel and unusual punishment unless the patient had volun-
tarily and knowingly consented to such treatment.
Some dispute exists as to the standard of care a mental institution is
required to exercise toward its patients. In Rodriguez v. State" 8 the plaintiff,
a profoundly retarded, paraplegic, five-year-old patient, sought recovery for
a supracondylar fracture of her lower left femur. The court, taking judicial
notice of the abysmally poor conditions in the Willowbrook State School,
determined that the plaintiff's injury was entirely foreseeable, and that the
state institution did not sustain its obligation of exercising the highest degree
of care. In Martarella v. Kelley, 11 however, the court considered allegations
of cruel and unusual punishment by juveniles confined in the juvenile
detention centers in New York City and enunciated a far more lenient
standard of care. The court stated "that the Eighth Amendment does not
impose on the States the requirement of furnishing the best possible service
for those in custody nor of adhering to the highest professional standard.
The office of the Eighth Amendment is to assure that custodial conditions
are minimally acceptable-that is, not cruel or unusual.'1 20
C. The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing Treatment Programs
The growth of the constitutional right to treatment and habilitation has
forced the judiciary to design and implement programs which adequately
insure proper care, education, and training for the mentally retarded. The
district court in Wyatt v. Stickney' 2' determined that the treatment programs
in Alabama state mental hospitals were scientifically and medically inade-
quate, but the court deferred action, allowing the state mental health board
six months to implement an adequate program. The Board, however, failed
to institute even minimum standards for treatment and habilitation.122 After
amici curiae and experts toured the state institution, a three-day hearing
culminated in an interim emergency order requiring immediate physical
improvements for the safety of the patients. The final order contained forty-
nine standards and guidelines covering treatment, habilitation, release, tran-
U.S. 715 (1961), the court found insufficient involvement by the state in the wrongful conduct
of the licensee.
116. 507 F.2d at 557.
117. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
118. 78 Misc. 2d 174, 355 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Ct. CI. 1974), rev'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 985, 376
N.Y.S.2d 685 (1975).
119. 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
120. Id. at 481.
121. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
122. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (order setting hearing).
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sitional programs, procedures, and other devices designed to guarantee the
constitutional rights of the residents of the institutions.123 The pronounce-
ment of these court-ordered standards represents the first occasion that a
federal court, utilizing constitutional rationale, has sought to delineate ac-
ceptable standards for habilitation and treatment.
This judicial activism is well illustrated in Gary v. Louisiana'24 in which
the court elaborately articulated standards of treatment and habilitation, and
ordered state officials to enter into a contract with the Louisiana State
University of Medicine for development and evaluation of the indi-
vidualized treatment plans. Consequently, the courts have been thrust into
the middle of sensitive policy determinations which they are ill-equipped to
handle by virtue of their inexperience in the administration of programs for
the mentally retarded. The courts have been forced into this unfortunate
position because of the failure of state legislatures and governors to adminis-
ter such programs.
The conflict between the courts and the legislative and executive branches
of the state governments regarding the propriety of judicial intervention in
habilitation programs is illustrated in Welsch v. Likins. 25 The district court
in Welsch noted that excessive seclusion, use of tranquilizers, and physical
restraints by the staff of a Minnesota mental institution possibly violated the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. In October 1974 Judge Larson ordered
the development of individual habilitation plans, extensive improvements in
physical facilities at the Cambridge State Hospital, limitations on physical
restraints, drugs, and seclusion, and the development of plans to relocate
residents in less restrictive facilities and residences in their communities.
The order required that funds be provided to the Department of Public
Welfare over and above the normal appropriation, and directed that the
funds be acquired through normal legislative channels. The Minnesota
Legislature, however, failed to appropriate sufficient funds to permit
compliance with the 1974 order. On July 28, 1976, Judge Larson ordered the
state commissioners of finance to disregard state laws which prohibited
state expenditure except when the legislature had formally appropriated
funds so that the 1974 order could be implemented.
While the state appealed to the Eighth Circuit, the Rules Committee of the
Minnesota Senate passed a resolution authorizing the expenditure of funds
to hire counsel to carry forward the appeal of the court order. On March 9,
1977, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court order which directed the
state fiscal expenditures, but indicated that the district court had the power
to issue such an order under appropriate circumstances at the conclusion of
the current session of the Minnesota state legislature. 26 The appellate court
indicated its strong support of the trial judge in his conflict with the legisla-
ture and observed:
In any event, we desire to make it clear to the present Governor and the
123. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (order granting injunction).
124. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
125. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
126. 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
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current legislature that the requirements of the 1974 Order and the
requirements of the April 15, 1976 Order that we uphold today are
positive, constitutional requirements, and cannot be ignored. We will
not presume they will be ignored. On the contrary, we think that
experience has shown that when governors and state legislatures see
clearly what their constitutional duty is with respect to state institutions
and realize that the duty must be discharged, they are willing to take
necessary steps, including the appropriation of necessary funds)"17
D. Federal Intervention to Insure the Right to Treatment
If state practices violate the constitutional rights to habilitation, treat-
ment, or freedom from cruel and barbarous treatment of the mentally
retarded, the question arises whether the Constitution provides the federal
government with authority to bring an action to protect these rights. The
district court in United States v. Solomon 128 held that no such power existed.
Although the court recognized that the federal government had inherent
power to act to promote the general welfare of the public, 129 the court
refused to extend this power to protect the civil rights of the mentally
retarded. The court recognized that the extension of such inherent federal
power into the state domain through the commerce clause was permissible,
but that the legislative history of title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957
revealed a rejection of a broad grant of power to the United States Attorney
General to bring an action under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
to protect the rights of American citizens.130 Moreover, the court viewed the
passage of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
as a means of using the "carrot and stick" approach by the federal govern-
ment to promote higher qualitative standards for habilitative care by the
state.' In essence, the decision mandates that the United States Attorney
General may only proceed under specific statutory authorization in order to
sue on behalf of the mentally retarded. 3 2 Under this legal reasoning the
existence of a constitutional right depends upon the existence of a statutory
right and, thus, denigrates a superior constitutional right. Furthermore, the
decision completely ignores the parens patriae role of the federal govern-
ment to protect this defenseless population from predatory state action.
V. FREEDOM FROM INSTITUTIONAL PEONAGE
It has been a common practice in the United States to have the in-
127. Id. at 1132.
128. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
129. This power, known as the "absolute necessity" factor, was first enunciated by Justice
Brewer in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
130. 419 F. Supp. at 370-71. The court in Solomon noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as
originally passed by the House of Representatives included a provision, title III, that permitted
the Attorney General to seek civil remedies for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. This provision
was deleted by the Senate and, consequently, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 limits the power of
the Attorney General to actions for injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970). The court
noted further that attempts to include the provisions of title III in the Civil Rights Acts of 1960
and 1964 were unsuccessful. 419 F. Supp. at 371.
131. Id. at 369-70.
132. Id. at 371; accord, United States v. Mattson, No. 74-1-138 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976),
noted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 77-21012, MENTAL
RETARDATION AND THE LAw 26 (Jan. 1978).
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stitutionalized mentally retarded work within the facility in which they
reside without fair compensation. This practice has been justified on several
bases. First, such work has been characterized as habilitative since the
worker develops a skill which may be helpful in attaining economic self-
sufficiency after leaving the institution. Secondly, the practice has been
labelled as treatment or therapy under the premise that work within the
institution aids the resident in developing a sense of routine and duty which
would prove helpful in reintegration in the community. Thirdly, some advo-
cates of institutional peonage justify work programs as a means to defray
the cost of caring for the patient. Fourthly, others maintain that routine
work programs are preferable to idle leisure because residents would prefer
to work rather than do nothing. Residents may be required to perform
unskilled duties such as dishwashing, food preparation, bedmaking, clean-
ing, window washing, and ironing, or be assigned more skilled roles in
carpentry, plumbing, mail sorting, gardening, general farm work, and auto
mechanics. Although the institution's administration may characterize work
details as voluntary, such labor is actually required, or at least perceived as
such by the residents. The patients are coerced to work through threats of
losing institutional privileges or being diagnosed as "unable to respond to
treatment."
The practice of institutional peonage bears many hallmarks of slavery,
and thus falls within the scope of the thirteenth amendment.' The resident
is usually unable to perform the duties he desires, and is equally unable to
cease performance at his leisure. Continuous work without a substantial
cash payment reduces the worker to slave-like status. Institutional peonage
additionally denies the worker important legal rights associated with work-
ing: social security benefits, worker's compensation, unemployment bene-
fits, and retirement rights.
An important means of ending institutional peonage has been the enact-
ment of appropriate legislation. The 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act'34 established minimum wage and maximum hour require-
ments for all employees of "an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce." By including employees engaged in the
operation of mental institutions within the above "enterprise concept,'
3 5
compensation for patient labor benefiting the institution would seem to be
required. The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz'36 upheld the validity of
the "enterprise concept" and extended the concept to a number of non-
professional educational and hospital employees of state and local govern-
ments. In Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 137 however,
133. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
134. Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966) (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.);
see United States v. Mattson, No. 74-1-138 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), noted in U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 77-21012, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW
26 (Jan. 1978).
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r)(1), (s)(4) (1976).
136. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
137. 411 U.S. 279 (1963).
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the Supreme Court concluded that the state enjoyed sovereign immunity
from an action brought by state employees to recover overtime compensa-
tion allegedly due under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Although this case appeared to foreclose actions under the FLSA by
mental patients in state institutions, the district court in Souder v. Bren-
nan 38 held to the contrary. In Souder mentally retarded patients in state
institutions sought an order directing the Secretary of Labor and other offi-
cials to enforce the provisions of the FLSA against state and private institu-
tions so that the patients would be covered by the hour and wage provisions
of the FLSA. The court construed the Act to include the plaintiffs and found
that the legislative history of the Act did not indicate congressional intent to
exclude patient workers in nonfederal institutions. The court's answer to the
contention that work constituted therapy was clear: "[S]o long as the institu-
tion derives any consequential benefit the economic reality test would
indicate an employment relationship, rather than mere therapeutic exercise.
To hold otherwise would be to make therapy the whole justification for
thousands of positions as dishwashers, kitchen helpers, [and] messengers
.... ,,139 The court order directed the Secretary of Labor to enforce the
Act and keep appropriate records of all actions dealing with the extension of
coverage to worker-patients in nonfederal institutions.
In 1974 Congress once again extended the coverage of the FLSA to
include virtually all areas of public employment, both state and federal."'
Various cities and states challenged the 1974 amendment in National League
of Cities v. Usery 141 in which the Supreme Court overruled the "far-reaching
implications" of Wirtz. Although the scope of the commerce clause is
plenary, the Court nevertheless concluded that the 1974 amendments were
an illegitimate exercise of the commerce power. As a result of Usery,
mentally retarded patient-workers in state facilities are no longer protected
by the minimum wage provisions under federal legislation. 42 But this does
not preclude protection under appropriate state minimum wage, maximum
hour legislation. Usery, in effect, has transferred the locus of institutional
peonage litigation from the federal forum into the state judicial system.
The pre- Usery era also witnessed the disposal of the minimum wage issue
by means of consent decree. In Weidenfeller v. Kidulis 141 the parties agreed
that disabled residents would receive the federal minimum wage except
when performing therapeutic or meaningless activities. A similar result was
reached in Jortberg v. Maine Department of Mental Health,144 with an
additional protection that residents who did not work would not be punished
or have their privileges withheld. The impact of Usery upon such consent
decrees is to render them suspect and dissipate justification for state ad-
ministrative officials to adopt a minimum wage payments policy under state
law.
138. 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
139. Id. at 813.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (1976).
141. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
142. See Roebuck v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitation Servs., 502 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir.
1974) (where the trial court entered judgment for defendants in light of Usery).
143. 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
144. No, 13-113 (D. Me. June 18, 1974).
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VI. THE EFFECT OF LOCAL LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ON GROUP
HOMES AND HALFWAY HOUSES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Although the principle of normalization requires that the mentally retard-
ed live in residential communities free from segregation and isolation, the
attitudes and actions of citizens in the community may prevent achievement
of this goal. The reactionary attitude toward normalization projects is illus-
trated by the early comment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re
Devereux Foundation, Inc.'45 In Devereux the foundation was refused a
permit to construct sleeping accommodations for impaired children attend-
ing the foundation school because a local ordinance prohibited the construc-
tion of a building to house the mentally deficient, weak, or abnormal. The
court stated:
[I]t is natural that the creation of a dormitory. . . should arouse added
apprehension among the neighbors, for the close presence of persons
who are below the normal standards of mental capacity and are subject
to psychological and psychiatric aberrations not only constitutes a
depressing factor calculated to interfere with the enjoyment of home
life but even involves the potential danger of physical disturbances."4
This attitude has precipitated the enactment of zoning ordinances, the public
referenda process, and restrictive covenants to exclude normalization pro-
jects from local communities, thereby limiting the retarded's right to live in
the community.
The right of a state to enact zoning statutes is derived from the power of a
state to promote the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. 47 The state
may entirely exclude usage of private property, provided the exclusion
bears a substantial relationship to the protection of the public,"4 or the state
may regulate and restrict the use of private property. An illustration of the
exclusionary effect which restrictive zoning statutes may have on normali-
zation projects for the mentally retarded is Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas.149 The ordinance in dispute in Village of Belle Terre restricted land
use to single family dwellings and prohibited occupancy of any building by
more than two persons who were not related as a family, although the
statute permitted cohabitation of an unlimited number of persons who were
related through blood, adoption, or marriage. Several unrelated college
145. 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945); see Jortberg v. Maine
Dep't of Mental Health, No. 13-113 (D. Me. June 18, 1974).
146. 351 Pa. at 485, 41 A.2d at 747.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. This police power may be used to create a residential district
in a specified area which excludes apartment houses, retail stores and billboards, provided the
exclusions are not arbitrary and have a reasonable and substantial relationship to the exercise of
such power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Under such authority,
specific businesses and activities such as brickmaking, liveries, stables, and the emission of
smoke and noxious fumes may be prohibited. Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); cf. Bacon v. Wailer, 204 U.S. 311 (1907)
(upholding Idaho statutes which prohibited sheepgrazing on public pastures within two miles of
another's habitation).
148. Where total exclusion occurs, the statutory provisions may provide for no deviation,
may provide for a variance from what is permitted under the regulation, or may delegate
authority for deviations or variances with appropriate conditions and restrictions on the appro-
priate administrator or a quasi-judicial body.
149. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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students challenged the statute, contending that it violated their equal pro-
tection rights, as well as their rights of association, privacy, and travel. 150 Of
particular importance to the establishment of small group homes for the
mentally retarded was the majority's response to the students' argument
that if two unmarried persons constitute a "family" under the ordinance,
then no legitimate reason exists why three or four unrelated persons should
not also constitute a "family." Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority
replied that the drawing of every legislative line leaves out some who might
have been included, but this exclusion was merely an exercise of legislative
judgment not subject to judicial review.15 ' This rationale may apply to
zoning ordinances which exclude small group homes for the mentally re-
tarded.
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the ordinance invaded the stu-
dents' first amendment rights of association and privacy by limiting their
selection of living companions and life style.' Justice Marshall's rationale
would safeguard the mentally retarded's right to group home living which is
essential to the normalization process. Retarded persons often find it dif-
ficult to live with their natural family and are able to function more effec-
tively under the guidance of professionally trained houseparents. In such an
environment each disabled member learns to function as part of an entire
household. These small group homes for the retarded, therefore, function as
single family units very similar to natural nuclear family units. Unless
Village of Belle Terre can be distinguished on factual grounds, this decision
may impose significant barriers to constitutional due process challenges of
local zoning restrictions that exclude group homes of the retarded, impairing
the normalization process of the retarded living in group homes.
The decision in Little Neck Community Association v. Working Organiza-
tion for Retarded Children53 illustrates that state courts may find alternative
grounds for allowing small group homes for the mentally retarded in neigh-
borhoods with zoning ordinances similar to the one in Village of Belle Terre.
The neighborhood in Little Neck was zoned for "single family" residences,
defined as "not more than four unrelated persons occupying a dwelling." In
holding that a small group home caring for twelve children five years of age
and older constituted a "family" under the ordinance, the court reasoned
that zoning was intended to control types of housing and living, not the
generic or intimate internal family relationships of the house occupants. The
court distinguished Village of Belle Terre on the grounds that it dealt with
transients who introduced a life style repugnant to traditional values, while
in the instant situation the proposed group home would provide retarded
children with a stable environment and an opportunity to develop to their
full potential.
In some instances local zoning ordinances which exclude small group
homes for the mentally retarded conflict with state legislation exempting
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id. at 13.
153. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. May 3, 1976), noted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, Pun. No. 76-21012, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW 28-29 (Sept. 1976).
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such homes from local regulation. In State v. City of Missoula'54 a city
zoning ordinance limited the single family zoning unit to a family related by
marriage, blood, or adoption, although the state law exempted homes for the
disabled from the provisions of the local zoning ordinances. In resolving the
conflict in favor of the state legislation on a general theory of supremacy,
the court reasoned that the city had the inherent power to adopt the "one
family" criterion for zoning, but this power was limited by subsequent state
legislative action. The trial court in City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough
Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc.' refused to submit a privately
owned, state subsidized home for the mentally retarded to regulation under
the single family zoning provision of a local ordinance, even though there
was no state statute similar to the statute in Missoula exempting the home.
The court applied the superior sovereign test, holding that since a munici-
pality was a creature of the state legislature, the city might not enact
legislation in areas preempted by the state. On appeal the Florida district
court of appeal reversed, conceding the validity of the superior sovereign
test but concluding that the doctrine could not be applied to the facts of this
case because no clear legislative intent could be ascertained regarding
whether the facility should be subject to zoning ordinances.156 The court
found that where no clear legislative intent could be determined the appro-
priate standard was the "balancing of interests" test which permitted a case-
by-case determination considering all factors properly influencing the re-
suit. 157
An additional barrier to securing the constitutional right of the mentally
retarded to reside in the community is illustrated by a recent Supreme Court
decision allowing a city to submit zoning questions to the people of the
community through the referendum process. In City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises' the city charter provided that proposed land use changes
must be submitted to public referendum and ratified by fifty-five percent of
the vote. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, concluded that the
due process rights of the landowner were not violated and rejected the
landowner's contention that the charter provision constituted an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to the electorate. 159 Chief Justice
Burger noted that the Constitution required that all power emanate from the
people, and, therefore, the people could resolve the issue themselves. The
referendum was held not to constitute a delegation of power, but to be a
direct exercise of power by the people. An express provision of the Ohio
Constitution which reserved the power of referendum to the people of each
municipality was a significant factor in the decision.
154. 168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975); accord, City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of
Health, No. 116571 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1975).
155. 322 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
156. 322 So. 2d at 577.
157. Id. at 578.
158. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See also Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 611 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
159. Cf. Washington v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (Court struck down a "standardless
delegation of power to a limited group of property owners" in the form of an ordinance which
permitted establishment of philanthropic homes for aged in residential areas only on the written
consent of the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet of the proposed facility).
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Justice Powell's dissent stressed the fundamental unfairness of the proce-
dure which denied the property owner a realistic opportunity to be heard on
the merits of the proposal. 160 Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that
the procedure violated fundamental due process since it submitted the
zoning issue to thousands of voters who had only a slight interest in the
matter. 161 Furthermore, he concluded the referendum procedure was funda-
mentally unfair because it disposed of the issue without a reasonable oppor-
tunity to consider the merits of the case under a set of defensible rules.
The effects of this development on housing programs for the retarded are
far reaching. If the political process is able to bring about the result reached
in Eastlake, then the door to normalization for the retarded may be closed.
Eastlake may shift the battleground from the courts to the political process,
where the struggle to secure the rights of the mentally retarded has already
begun.
In some communities opponents of normalization projects challenge
group living arrangements for the mentally retarded on the basis of restric-
tive covenants limiting the use of property to single family dwellings. Re-
cently, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berger v. State162 upheld the right
of the state to operate small group homes for the mentally retarded on
property subject to reciprocal negative covenants which prohibited usages
other than for single family dwellings. The court affirmed the lower court
holding that the restrictive covenants regulated the type of the structure and
not the occupancy or use of the premises. The court reasoned that since the
facility was used for a private residential dwelling purpose, this purpose was
within the framework of the negative reciprocal covenants.
The outcome appears to depend upon a number of factors. These include
whether state legislation has preempted local zoning ordinances, the detailed
provisions of the contracts created to provide the service, and the extent to
which actual operations fall within the use perimeters of the property as a
single family use function.
VII. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
AND ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Due process arguments have been raised in various areas affecting the
mentally retarded. The core of the due process concept is one of fundamen-
tal justice rooted in the traditions and conscience of our society. 63 The
requisites of due process are searchingly applied to legislative, judicial,
executive, and administrative processes of both federal and state govern-
ments. Recognizing that what is fair in one situation may be unfair in
another, the due process principle is flexible. But such flexibility does not
provide the justification for denying the rights of an individual merely
because of a mental handicap. Until recently, nonetheless, the mentally
retarded have been denied the procedural protection of the due process
clause in the areas of involuntary commitment and access to education.
160. 426 U.S. at 680.
161. Id. at 690.
162. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
163. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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A. Access to Education
The landmark decision in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania16" established procedural protections for children excluded
from public school programs. The federal district court concluded that a
child may not be denied admission to a public school program or have his
educational status altered without proper notice of the reasons for exclu-
sion, a hearing, the right to counsel, the right to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, the right to an independent medical, psychological, and
educational evaluations, the right to a transcript of the hearings, and the
right to a decision based on the recorded evidence and testimony. Procedur-
al due process violations were also recognized by the court in Mills v. Board
of Education,165 where the court stated:
Not only are plaintiffs and their class denied the publicly supported
education to which they are entitled many are suspended or expelled
from regular schooling or specialized instruction or reassigned without
any prior hearing and are given no periodic review thereafter. Due
process of law requires a hearing prior to exclusion, termination of
classification into a special program.166
The elements of a due process hearing similar to those in Pennsylvania
Association were detailed by the court in Mills. 167
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of procedural
due process rights for the mentally retarded in the field of public education,
Goss v. Lopez 68 provides some indication of the nature of these rights. In a
five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated an Ohio statute which permitted
the principal of a public school to suspend a student for up to ten days or to
expel him for misconduct, after notifying the parents and giving reasons for
the discipline within twenty-four hours. Speaking for the majority of the
Court, Justice White observed that in providing a public education program,
due process required a hearing and an opportunity for the student to deny or
answer the reasons for dismissal. The majority approvingly cited Mills,
noting that the due process clause was applicable to actions taken by tax
supported educational institutions. 69 Justice Powell's dissent insisted that a
ten-day suspension from school was not of constitutional dimension, since
due process applied only to severe detriment or grievous loss. 170 The dissent-
ing opinion noted that extending due process protection to public education
would result in judicial interference in day-to-day school administration.
Recognizing the nonadversarial character of the pupil-school relationship,
the dissent feared that placing due process protection on school discipline
would further exacerbate conflict and promote adversary relationships.
The post-Goss decisions indicate that once a hearing has been held, the
appellate courts will be reluctant to reverse the holding. In Taylor v. Mary-
164. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
165. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
166. Id. at 875.
167. Id. at 880-83.
168. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
169. Id. at 578 n.8.
170. Id. at 587.
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land School for the Blind 71 a hearing was held for a multi-handicapped child
excluded from a program on the grounds of failure to benefit from the
program, and alternate placement for custodial service was recommended.
Noting that due process demanded a full and flexible hearing to meet the
needs of the individual circumstance, the court refused to substitute its
judgment for that of experienced authorities when the decision did not rest
upon arbitrary or capricious standards but was an exercise of judgment upon
facts developed during the hearing.
B. Involuntary Commitment
By contrast, the development of due process rights in the field of commit-
ment have not been as neatly unidirectional. Until recently, most
communities provided care for the mentally retarded in public or private
institutions. The "least restrictive alternative" doctrine enunciated in Shel-
ton v. Tucker 72 and the increasing acceptance of the concept of "normaliza-
tion," however, have forced deemphasis of institutionalization. A decade
after Shelton the district court in Dixon v. Attorney General'73 concluded
that Pennsylvania's civil commitment statute for the mentally ill and mental-
ly retarded violated due process because an individual was entitled to notice
of the charges and a hearing. The right to a hearing included the right to
counsel, the right to present evidence, the right to subpoena witnesses and
records, and the right to cross-examine.
The following year District Judge Sprecher canvassed the entire area of
due process in commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded in Les-
sard v. Schmidt.'74 The plaintiff in Lessard sought to enjoin the Wisconsin
involuntary commitment statute which failed to provide for notification of
the specific charges justifying detention, permitted detention for more than
forty-eight hours without a hearing, failed to provide a right to jury trial or
right to counsel, and permitted a decision based on hearsay and psychiatric
evidence elicited without the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The plaintiff also contended that the statute did not provide for con-
sideration of less restrictive alternatives other than commitment to an in-
stitution.
The court recognized that there may be emergency circumstances which
would permit short-term detention without a hearing, but held that detention
of longer than forty-eight hours without a hearing was impermissible, and
prohibited waiver of the right to a hearing. Under the Lessard decision the
proof establishing the necessity of commitment must be beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The court stated: "The argument for a stringent standard of
proof is more compelling in the case of a civil commitment in which an
individual will be deprived of basic civil rights and be certainly stigmatized
171. 409 F. Supp. 148 (D. Md. 1976).
172. 364 U.S. 479 (1960); accord, Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
173. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
174. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
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by the lack of confidentiality of the adjudication."'175 Noting that psychiatric
interviews and examinations raise the possibility of self-incrimination, the
court in Lessard determined that the privilege against self-incrimination
should be applied in civil commitment proceedings, and the detainee must be
informed of the right before any statement is made. Finally, the court ruled
that hearsay evidence should be excluded in a civil commitment proceeding
on the grounds that the possible loss of liberty justified the strictest standard
of evidence. Lessard thus provides a complete panoply of due process
rights. 176
In instances where a parent-guardian or other legal representative of a
mentally retarded person requests civil commitment, the courts are not in
agreement as to the applicability of procedural safeguards. In Saville v.
Treadway'77 the plaintiffs challenged a Tennessee statute which permitted
commitment of the mentally retarded upon application by the parent or
guardian. Alternatively, any spouse or close adult relative of the individual,
or any health or public welfare officer, or school official could request
commitment if the application was accompanied by a certificate from a
licensed physician stating that an examination of the individual had been
conducted within thirty days from the date on which commitment was
sought, and that the individual was mentally retarded and needed institution-
al care and treatment. The district court recognized that the unrestricted
power of the parent or guardian to place the retarded person in an institution
for life constituted a deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law. The court noted that, "[t]he procedures required by due
process vary with the nature of the case, and the more serious the depriva-
tion the more extensive the procedural safeguards which must precede its
imposition.' 78 The court framed a comprehensive order which embodied
the right to a hearing of an informal and nontechnical character and notice
thereof, the right to counsel, the right to present and rebut evidence, and the
right to a decision based on the evidence presented.
Conversely, the right to procedural due process protection was rejected in
Bartley v. Kremens,179 which involved the constitutionality of the Pennsyl-
vania commitment law. The statute permitted a parent to apply for the
commitment of a child or ward under eighteen years of age, and did not
provide for pre-commitment due process protections. The district court
found that no constitutional right to a pre-commitment hearing existed for
juveniles committed by parents or guardians because of the strong tradition
of parental concern for their children. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found
that the constitutional issue was mooted in light of a new state statute
175. Id. at 1095.
176. An earlier Tenth Circuit case, Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968),
reached a similar conclusion without an as extensively supported analysis. The court there
stated that, "(w]here, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons, the
state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process
. Id. at 396.
177. 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
178. Id. at 432.
179. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated as moot, remanded for substitution of class
representatives with valid claims, 97 S. Ct. 1709, 52 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1977).
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prohibiting a parent from committing a child fourteen years of age or older.
The Court remanded the case to the district court for the exclusion of moot
claims and the substitution of class representatives with valid claims.8 0
When a statute provides for involuntary commitment of the mentally
retarded, the standards of commitment must be precise and comport with
due process requirements. In Goldy v. Bea1181 the court held the standard
"in need of care and treatment" in the Pennsylvania Mental Health &
Mental Retardation Act of 1966182 unconstitutionally vague, noting that the
statute did not limit the discretion of administrative officials to prevent
arbitrary action.
While the procedural due process cases indicate that a hearing is essential,
there is no agreement upon the need for a preliminary hearing preceding
detention. The court in Bartley was impressed by the argument that circum-
stances may exist whereby an individual may be temporarily committed for
his own safety or the safety of others without a preliminary hearing, and
Lessard established a maximum forty-eight hour emergency commitment
without a hearing. Apparently there is judicial consensus that due process
requires a hearing prior to commitment unless there are compelling
emergency reasons for short-term detention, and an opportunity to chal-
lenge the action at a subsequent hearing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has indicated the emergence of constitutional rights for the
mentally retarded, a trend resulting from increased litigation following un-
successful efforts to secure recognition of these rights from state adminis-
trators of various programs in housing, education, and state institutions. A
significant characteristic emerging from this recent litigation is the active
role of the judiciary in securing these rights, but doubts exist as to the
propriety of judicial involvement in the daily administration of programs for
the retarded. Critics note the judiciary's inexperience in administering such
programs, and label the judiciary's involvement as an intrusion into another
branch of government. Yet too often these efforts, mischaracterized as
judicial usurpation, represent judicial response to the void created by ad-
ministrative rigidity and legislative disinterest
Three steps are required to assure the rights of the mentally retarded.
First, aggressive political leadership is needed in the executive departments
of state government. Administrators of various programs affecting the re-
tarded must recognize the need to reorient their professional values by
accepting and enforcing these new rights. In addition, training seminars
acquainting local administrators with these emerging rights would bring
immediate policy changes at the level where the impact upon the lives of the
retarded is the greatest. Furthermore, an urgent need exists for review and
amendment of the programs affecting the retarded to reflect these emerging
rights. By eliminating obsolete statutory provisions and regulations the
present pace of litigation will decrease dramatically.
180. Kremens v. Bartley, 97 S. Ct. 1709, 52 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1977).
181. No. 75-791 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50. § 4406 (Purdon 1966).
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Secondly, widespread educational programs must be instituted to ac-
quaint the bar and judiciary with the problems, issues, and trends in this
field. Although the current efforts of the American Bar Association are
commendable, these efforts need to be extended to state, county, and city
bar associations. Information, education, and training programs to improve
the practitioner's skills will enhance the quality of service rendered to the
retarded. Parallel programs are also required to orient all levels of the
judiciary. In this regard, the judiciary has an important role in explaining
and suggesting solutions to various problems to the legislature.
Finally, state legislatures have periodically reviewed and updated their
criminal codes, commercial legislation, and inheritance laws. There is a
similar need for a cohesive, longitudinal examination of the entire spectrum
of rights for the retarded in order to eliminate archaic, obsolete, and barbar-
ic legislation presently in the statutes.
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